A Systematic Approach to Safe and High Reliability Care

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HCIF & PASHRM
April 4, 2019
Why is This Work Critically Important?

It provides a framework to integrate all your initiatives, and the foundation to successfully execute them.

Clear focus on culture, which is essential for world class care and sustainable value creation. Culture is the social glue – it reflects the attitudes and behaviors of the people delivering care.

It not only enhances your ability to care for your patients, but also your caregivers.

This is not more work to do, but a systematically proven method of integrating your work, and making it easier to deliver on the mission.
Framework for Clinical Excellence
Cultural Maturity Model

- **UNMINDFUL**
  Who cares as long as we’re not caught
  *Chronically Complacent*

- **REACTIVE**
  Safety is important. We do a lot every
time we have an accident

- **SYSTEMATIC**
  We have systems in place to manage all hazards

- **PROACTIVE**
  Anticipating and preventing problems
  before they occur; Comfort speaking up

- **GENERATIVE**
  Safety is how we do business around here
  *Constantly Vigilant and Transparent*

*Tipping Point – Psych Safety*

*Adapted from Safeskies 2001, “Aviation Safety Culture,” Patrick Hudson, Centre for Safety Science, Leiden University*
Avoidable Patient Harm

30% of hospitalized patients have something happen to them that you and I wouldn’t want to happen to us.

10% are harmed seriously enough to stay in the hospital longer and go home with a disability.
Emerging Epidemic: Healthcare Burnout & Psychological Safety

- 34% of staff unable to speak up to share ideas or concerns about patient care.
- 47% of US healthcare workers are Burned Out. ¼ RNs leave in 1st year practice.
- 1 in 10 of US patients experience preventable harm in leading healthcare systems. >>200K fatalities per year.

Burnout is a huge priority everywhere.

46% CEOs say Culture of Safety high priority.
The legacy of harm in healthcare

Historically medicine was based on the individual expert model – highly skilled practitioners trying hard and paying attention would not make mistakes.

Harm was considered an unfortunate but acceptable price for all the positive therapeutic interventions – “the price of progress”

Patient safety and the High Reliability Organizations (HRO) brought a different perspective – the goal needs to be be zero avoidable harm
In the 1980’s researchers realized there were certain organizations that managed risk and hazards exceeding well. They operated under high production pressures with hazardous conditions quite safely.

The prevalent safety model prior to this was the Natural Accident Theory, which accepted that accidents, failures and harm were inevitable outcomes of managing risk.

What about healthcare?
High Reliability in Medicine (HRO)

Effective Leadership

Culture of Safety

Effective Teamwork & Communication

Reliable processes of Care & Data

Continuous Learning & Improvement
Measuring Culture - SCORE

Integrated instrument – Safety, Burnout, Engagement
Best psychometrics – highly validated
Leapfrog, Magnet certified
Aligns with Framework - Diagnostic and actionable
Adjusts to caregiver type
Safety and Teamwork climate allow legacy SAQ comparison
Published Best Practice: Visible Unit-Level Improvement Systems With Structured Teamwork Drive Measurable Transformation

Michigan SCORE Survey Data with and without Closing the Loop on Ideas and Concerns from the Frontline

Better Culture, Burnout and Engagement measures when WalkRounds feedback is provided

n=16,797 respondents
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/early/2017/10/09/bmjqs-2016-006399
# The Impact Of Acting on Safety Culture Data In Rhode Island ICUs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICUs that DEBRIEFED</th>
<th>ICUs that did not DEBRIEF</th>
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</table>
| Reflected on culture scores and took action  
  1. >15% culture score increase in 5/7 domains  
  2. >10% BSI reduction  
  3. >15% VAP reduction | Did not reflect on SAQ scores nor take action  
  1. 5% culture score drop in 5/7 domains  
  2. No reduction in BSIs  
  3. 5% increase in VAPs |

**The Impact Of Acting on Safety Culture Data In Rhode Island ICUs**

[Image: Safety Attitudes Questionnaire Domain Scores]

*Courtesy of Margaret Vigorito*
The improvement readiness scale of the SCORE survey: a metric to assess capacity for quality improvement in healthcare

Kathryn C. Adair\textsuperscript{1,2}, Krystina Quow\textsuperscript{3}, Allan Frankel\textsuperscript{4}, Paul J. Mosca\textsuperscript{5,6}, Jochen Profit\textsuperscript{7}, Allison Hadley\textsuperscript{8}, Michael Leonard\textsuperscript{4} and J. Bryan Sexton\textsuperscript{1,2}

Abstract

Background: Quality improvement efforts are inextricably linked to the readiness of healthcare workers to take them on. The current study aims to clarify the nature and measurement of Improvement Readiness (IR) by 1) examining the psychometric properties of a novel IR scale, 2) assessing relationships between IR and other safety culture domains 3) exploring whether IR differs by healthcare worker demographic factors, and 4) examining linguistic differences in word type use between high and low scoring IR work settings from their free text responses.

Methods: Of 13,040 eligible healthcare workers across a large academic health system, 10,627 (response rate 81\%) completed the 5-item IR scale, demographics, safety culture scales, and two open-ended questions. Psychometric analyses, correlations and ANOVAs tested the properties of IR. Linguistic Inquiry Word Count software assessed comments from open-ended questions.

Results: The IR scale exhibited strong psychometric properties and a one factor model fit the data well (Cronbach’s alpha = .93; RMSEA = .07; CFI = .99; TLI = .99). IR scores differed significantly by role, shift, shift length, and years in specialty. IR correlated significantly and in expected directions with safety culture scales. Linguistic analyses revealed that people in low versus high IR work settings used significantly more words in their responses, and specifically more past tense verbs (e.g., “ignored”), negative emotion words (e.g., “upset”), and first person singular (“I”). Workers from high IR work settings used significantly more positive emotions words (e.g., “grateful”) and social words (e.g., “team”).

Conclusion: The IR scale exhibits strong psychometric properties, is associated with better safety and teamwork climate, lower burnout, and predicts linguistic differences in high versus low IR groups.

Keywords: Improvement readiness, SCORE, quality improvement, Qualitative responses, Learning environment, Safety culture survey
Why is Culture Important?

Culture reflects the behaviors and beliefs within an organization.

There are behaviors that create value; behaviors that create unacceptable risk.

Culture is the social glue

Work as Imagined v. Work as Done
CULTURE IS RELATED TO...

Teamwork Climate Scores Across Facility

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<th>Department</th>
<th>HCAHPS</th>
<th>Medication Errors per Month</th>
<th>Days between C Diff Infections</th>
<th>Days between Stage 3 Pressure Ulcers</th>
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<tr>
<td>OB</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52</td>
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Illustrative Data: Extracted from Blinded Client Data
Teamwork Climate Across Michigan ICUs

The strongest predictor of clinical excellence: caregivers feel comfortable speaking up if they perceive a problem with patient care.

No BSI = 5 months or more w/ zero
Local Leadership and Psychological Safety % Positive Response

Months between Wrong Sites Surgeries or Retained Foreign Bodies

- 6
- 12
- 40

Where Would You Rather Have An Operation?
Why Integrated Culture Measurement?

Safety Score

- Average of TeamworkClimate
- Average of SafetyClimate
- Average of ThreatAwareness
- Average of WorkLifeBalance
- Average of JustClimate
- Average of ResilienceClimate

Tier I
Tier II
Tier III

Courtesy Dr. Bryan Sexton, Duke University
Valuable Cultural Lessons

Culture matures over time

There are essential elements necessary to build and sustain a culture of safety

Culture is the social glue to deliver safe, highly reliable care. Technical expertise alone is inadequate

Measuring well, providing feedback and building a Learning System are essential components
Senior Leadership

**GENERATIVE**
Organization wired for safety and improvement

**PROACTIVE**
Playing offense - thinking ahead, anticipating, solving problems

**SYSTEMATIC**
Systems in place to manage hazards

**REACTIVE**
Playing defense – reacting to events

**UNMINDFUL**
No awareness of safety culture

Cyclic flow of information with feedback and organizational learning

Systematic engagement with dialogue, support and learning

Process for interaction between senior leaders and front line staff

They’re here – something bad must have happened

We don’t know or see them
Published Best Practice: Visible Unit-Level Improvement Systems With Structured Teamwork Drive Measurable Transformation

Michigan SCORE Survey Data with and without Closing the Loop on Ideas and Concerns from the Frontline

Better Culture, Burnout and Engagement measures when WalkRounds feedback is provided

n=16,797 respondents
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/early/2017/10/09/bmjqs-2016-006399
Leaders create high degrees of psych safety and accountability.

Leaders model the desired behaviors to drive culture of safety

Training and support exists for building clinical leadership

Episodic, completely dependent on the individual clinician

Absent for the most part
Reliable feedback is essential for a healthy unit culture.
In this work setting, local leadership regularly makes time to provide positive feedback to me about how I am doing.

Source Data: Jun 2018
A wide variety of skills across the middle

10%
Absent
Burned Out
Socially Inept
Psychopathic
Disinterested

80%
Clinically excellent
Well meaning
Socially Adept
Inadequately Trained

10%
Engaged and
Knowledgeable in
Organizational development
Whole system change
Measurement to manage
Know culture IS a process

A Surgical Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbidity and Mortality in a Global Population


ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND

Surgery has become an integral part of global health care, with an estimated 234 million operations performed yearly. Surgical complications are common and often preventable. We hypothesized that a program to implement a 19-item surgical safety checklist designed to improve team communication and consistency of care would reduce complications and deaths associated with surgery.

METHODS

Between October 2007 and September 2008, eight hospitals in eight cities (Toronto, Canada; New Delhi, India; Amman, Jordan; Auckland, New Zealand; Manila, Philippines; Jakarta, Tanzania; London, England; and Seattle, WA) representing a variety of economic circumstances and diverse populations of patients participated in the World Health Organization’s Safe Surgery Saves Lives program. We prospectively collected data on clinical processes and outcomes from 37,333 consecutively enrolled patients 16 years of age or older who were undergoing noncardiac surgery. We subsequently collected data on 3955 consecutively enrolled patients after the introduction of the Surgical Safety Checklist. The primary end point was the rate of complications, including death, during hospitalization within the first 30 days after the operation.

RESULTS

The rate of death was 1.3% before the checklist was introduced and declined to 0.8% afterward (P = 0.003). Inpatient complications occurred in 11.0% of patients at baseline and in 7.0% after introduction of the checklist (P = 0.001).

CONCLUSIONS

Implementation of the checklist was associated with concomitant reductions in the rates of death and complications among patients at least 16 years of age who were undergoing noncardiac surgery in a diverse group of hospitals.

From the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (D.B.U, A.C.G., B.R.A., S.A.M., N.B.), the Department of Surgery (D.B.U., A.C.G., B.R.A., N.B.), and Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation (D.B.U., N.B.), University of Toronto, the University Health Network, the University Health Network, Mount Sinai Hospital (A.C.G., S.A.M.), and Keenan Research Centre, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, St. Michael’s Hospital (A.C.G., B.R.A., N.B.), Centre for Surgical Safety and Quality, St. Michael’s Hospital (N.B.), and Toronto Academic Health Science Network. SPECIAL ARTICLE

Introduction of Surgical Safety Checklists in Ontario, Canada

David R. Urbach, M.D., Anand Govindarajan, M.D., Reif Sasin, M.Sc., Andrew S. Wilton, M.Sc., and Nancy N. Baxter, M.D., Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND

Evidence from observational studies that the use of surgical safety checklists results in striking improvements in surgical outcomes led to the rapid adoption of such checklists worldwide. However, the effect of mandatory adoption of surgical safety checklists is unclear. A policy encouraging the universal adoption of checklists by hospitals in Ontario, Canada, provided a natural experiment to assess the effectiveness of checklists in typical practice settings.

METHODS

We surveyed all acute care hospitals in Ontario to determine when surgical safety checklists were adopted. Using administrative health data, we compared operative mortality, rate of surgical complications, length of hospital stay, and rates of hospital readmission and emergency department visits within 30 days after discharge among patients undergoing a variety of surgical procedures before and after adoption of a checklist.

RESULTS

During 3-month periods before and after adoption of a surgical safety checklist, a total of 101 hospitals performed 105,341 and 106,376 procedures, respectively. The adjusted risk of death during a hospital stay or within 30 days after surgery was 0.71% (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.66 to 0.76) before implementation of a surgical checklist and 0.66% (95% CI, 0.60 to 0.70) afterward (risk ratio, 0.93; 95% CI, 0.80 to 1.03; P = 0.13). The adjusted risk of surgical complications was 3.86% (95% CI, 3.70 to 3.96) before implementation and 3.82% (95% CI, 3.71 to 3.92) afterward (risk ratio, 0.97; 95% CI, 0.90 to 1.03; P = 0.29).

CONCLUSIONS

Implementation of surgical safety checklists in Ontario, Canada, was not associated with significant reductions in operative mortality or complications. (Funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research.)

From the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (D.B.U, A.C.G., B.R.A., S.A.M., N.B.), the Department of Surgery (D.B.U., A.C.G., B.R.A., N.B.), and Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation (D.B.U., N.B.), University of Toronto, the University Health Network, the University Health Network, Mount Sinai Hospital (A.C.G., S.A.M.), and Keenan Research Centre, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, St. Michael’s Hospital (A.C.G., B.R.A., N.B.), Centre for Surgical Safety and Quality, St. Michael’s Hospital (N.B.), and Toronto Academic Health Science Network.
Effective Leadership

Set a positive active tone
Think out loud to share the plan – common mental model
Continuously invite people into the conversation for their expertise and concern
Use their names
Psychological Safety

**GENERATIVE**
HRO - wired for safety and safety

**PROACTIVE**
Playing offense - anticipating,

**SYSTEMATIC**
Systems in place to manage hazards

**REACTIVE**
Playing defense – reacting to events

**UNMINDFUL**
No awareness of safety culture

- Primary responsibility of leaders, continuously modeled everywhere.
- Leaders model and expect the behaviors that promote psychological safety.
- In some units it feels safe to speak up and voice a concern.
- Personality dependent – it depends who I’m working with.
- Fear based – keep your head down and stay out of trouble.
Cursed by Knowledge — Building a Culture of Psychological Safety

Lisa Rosenbaum, M.D.

On Christmas Day about a decade ago, Thor Sundt, now chief of cardiac surgery at Massachusetts General Hospital, was urgently summoned to transplant a heart into a young man with ischemic heart disease. Sundt’s satisfaction with the man’s hemodynamic stability turned to horror when, the next day, the patient didn’t wake up. An air embolism had formed during surgery; the man was brain dead. Depressed for months afterward, Sundt tried to console himself: He was so sick. And I gave it my best shot. But no attempt at self-fulfillment could obscure the painful truth: This willingness to take interpersonal risks at work, whether to admit error, ask a question, seek help, or simply say “I don’t know,” is part of what organizational psychologists refer to as “psychological safety.” Edmondson has spent two decades elucidating why psychological safety is critical to effective collaboration in environments involving dynamic teams, high stakes, and significant interdependence — environments, that is, like the hospital. On a macro level, medicine endorses seeking help (calling for a consult, for example). But what makes psy-
In this work setting, it is not difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with patient care.

Source Data: Sep 2018
In this work setting, it is not difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with patient care.

Caregivers in the same unit seeing the world quite differently

Source Data: Jun 2018
Psychological Safety

What are the things that make it hard to speak up here?

What are the 1-2 things we can do to make it better? Describe them in a way that they are actionable, visible and measurable.
Google

Laszlo Bock

Culture is imminently measurable

Julia Rozovsky

Two attributes of great teams:

1. Everyone speaks up in equal amounts
2. Team members are attuned to how others or intelligence"
Effective Teamwork

Teamwork and continuous learning deeply embedded and central to our culture

Teamwork methodically taught and modeled across the organization

Training and tools available, partial implementation

Focus on teamwork awareness / training in response to adverse events

If people would just do their jobs we’d have no problems
The people here from different disciplines backgrounds work together as a well coordinated team.

Dealing with difficult colleagues is NOT consistently a challenging part of my job.

Communication breakdowns are NOT common when this work setting interacts with other work settings.

Communication breakdowns are NOT common in this work setting.

In this work setting, it is NOT difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with patient care.

It is easy for personnel here to ask questions when there is something that they do not understand.

Disagreements in this work setting are appropriately resolved (i.e., not who is right but what is best for the patient).

The percentage who agreed slightly or agreed strongly with each question.
WHAT TEAMS DO:

Plan Forward
- Brief (huddle, pause, timeout, check-in)

Reflect Back
- Debrief

Communicate Clearly
- Structured Communication SBAR and Repeat-Back

Manage Conflict
- Critical Language
Critical Language
A PHRASE THAT STOPS THE WORK

“I need a little clarity.”

“I am concerned or unclear. This is unsafe.”
"A fair amount of the doctors are bullies. There are no sort of reprimands for them if they demean or act cruelly to the staff. In my 60 day orientation I watched a video about work place bullying that describes their actions perfectly."

We work very hard on working with each other and being a family. We pride ourselves every time someone comes in and says "wow everyone is so happy here".
Burnout & Resilience
Burnout is a significant issue.

If we can’t take care of people providing care, we’re not going to effectively take care of the people needing care.
Burnout is associated with:

**Infections**

**Medication Errors**

**Higher Standardized Mortality Ratios**
Welp, Meier & Manser. Front Psychol. 2015 Jan 22;5:1573.

**Lower Patient Satisfaction**
Christina Maslach, PhD
author of the
Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI)
Professor Emeritus, Berkeley

MBI 3 Pillars of Burnout:

• Emotional Exhaustion (overwhelmed, drained, unable to meet demands)
• Depersonalization (callousness, seeing others as objects)
• Inefficacy (diminishes sense of accomplishment)
Influencing Factors in Burnout / Resilience

• Do I feel valued by the organization?
• Do I have a voice?
• Do I feel supported in the work I do?
• Do I have the tools and resources to do my job?
Just Culture

**GENERATIVE**
Organization wired for safety and improvement

**PROACTIVE**
Playing offense - thinking ahead, anticipating, solving problems

**SYSTEMATIC**
Systems in place to manage

**REACTIVE**
Playing defense – reacting to events

**UNMINDFUL**
No awareness of safety culture

Real events are shared by leaders, true culture of accountability and learning

Clear ways to differentiate individual v. system error, safe to discuss mistakes

Well understood algorithm, learning is the priority

Depends who the boss is, blame and punishment are common

Nothing good will come from talking about mistakes
Reliably excellent patient centered care is dependent on healthcare departments that are effective learning systems; they routinely identify their defects and errors, recognize the harm they cause patients, and strive to learn from these errors and improve their care. Just Culture and Professionalism contribute to the growth of learning cultures where healthcare workers feel safe to speak up when they witness errors and feel secure in knowing that others will contribute to learning from those errors. The job of the Just Culture & Professionalism Committee is to safeguard Professionalism and Just Culture in order to protect and promote robust learning systems.

### Just Culture Model

**Event or Near Event**

- **Step 1:** Identify participants, and exclude those with impaired judgment or whose actions might be malicious. If impaired judgment refer to senior leaders and HR department. If malicious, refer to Risk and HR departments.
- **Step 2:** If professional behavior is a component in any way, perform Professional Behavior Evaluation.

**Behavior Evaluation**

- **Step 2:** Assign initial level of intent: use best judgment to categorize each action as either Reckless, Risky, or Unintentional. The determination determines the general level of culpability and possible disciplinary actions, however these general categories must be modified using Steps 3 and 4 below.

**RECKLESS ACTION**

- The individual knowingly violated a rule or made a dangerous decision without accountability.
- The decision appears to be self-serving and has been made with little or no concern about risk.

**RISKY ACTION**

- The caregiver made a potentially unsafe choice.
- The evaluation of relative risk appears to be erroneous.

**UNINTENTIONAL**

- The individual made a mistake or participated in an error while working within the limits of their knowledge and in the patient’s best interest.

**Step 3:** Evaluate system influences to modify level of intent by performing a Substitution Test: Ask 3 others with similar skills if they, in a similar situation, would or would not have taken the same action. If the answer is “No” the test is negative and the individual is likely accountable. If the answer is “Yes” the system influences are likely substantial. Evaluators may ask about system factors such as schedules leading inevitably to fatigue, unrealistic expectations regarding memory, inappropriate communication, an unsafe learning environment, or distractions or interruptions. If answers are divided, evaluators should assign accountability with a goal to ensure perceptions of fairness by others.

**Step 4:** Evaluate the individual for a history of unsafe acts: Evaluate whether the individual has a history of unsafe or problematic acts. If they did, then they may be in the wrong job. Organizations should have a reasonable and agreed upon statute of limitations for taking these actions into account.

**Step 5:** Final Evaluation:

- **RECKLESS:** If the Substitution Test is positive, the system supports reckless behavior and system leaders are accountable. The caregiver’s behavior is unsafe; they are accountable for their actions.
- **RISKY:** If the Substitution Test is positive, the system supports risky behavior and system leaders are accountable. The caregiver’s behavior may suggest the individual is in the wrong job.
- **UNINTENTIONAL:** If the Substitution Test is negative, system leaders are accountable. The caregiver’s behavior may suggest the individual is in the wrong job.

**Step 6:** Promote learning and improvement

- The caregiver should be involved in teaching the lessons learned to others.
- The caregiver should participate in teaching the lessons learned to others.

**Professional Behavior Evaluation and Intervention**

- **Step 1:** Conduct confidential conversation with reporter regarding Focus Person (FP) behaviors. Categorize types of behaviors as well as frequency and severity. Conduct confidential interviews with others.
- **Behavior categories include:**
  - Demeaning/angry, hypercritical, uncivil, shaming, trivializing, blaming, and other acting in a manner that undermines trust and learning.

- **Step 2:** Feedback Conversation Coaching: IF the concern is deemed an isolated incident, the FP has not had any other issues, and the reporter feels safe to do so, provide coaching for the reporter on how to give the FP direct feedback regarding behaviors. IF the situation is more complex, proceed to Step 3.

- **Step 3:** Assessing Concerns: To validate the concerns and assess their frequency and severity, conduct multi-source interviews to provide comprehensive insight into, and corroborate or disprove, alleged behavior.

- **Step 4:** Involve Supervisor: Share findings of assessment with FP’s manager, department chair, division chair, or supervising physician. Discuss a plan for feedback intervention (Step 5) if deemed necessary.

- **Step 5:** Feedback Intervention

  - Involved supervisor and professional responsibility meet with FP to discuss/review:
    - specific disruptive behaviors
    - FP’s perspective on factors (including systems) that may be contributing to the behavior
    - resources for facilitating behavioral changes
    - plans for monitoring behavior
    - unacceptable retaliation
    - (if applicable) potential consequences for not adhering to behavioral expectations

  - A follow-up email is sent to the FP summarizing the meeting.

- **Step 6:** Monitoring and Support

  - Inform those reporting concerns that an intervention has occurred.
  - Inquire of them and others about their subsequent behaviors.
  - Have FP’s supervisor address any issues raised in Step 5.
  - Keep process discrete and respectful to FP.

- **Step 7:** Intervention to Address Subsequent Lapses

  - Develop a plan of action with institutional administration and legal counsel. Select institutional administrators meet with FP to detail expected behavioral changes and consequences, including termination.

- **Step 8:** Final Evaluation

  - Evaluate whether the individual has a history of unsafe or problematic acts. If they do, this may influence decisions about the appropriate responsibilities for the individual i.e. they may be in the wrong job. Organizations should have a reasonable and agreed upon statute of limitations for taking these actions into account.

Jo Shapiro MD and Allan Franklin MD, ©2013, Safe and Reliable Healthcare, LLC, www.safeandreliablecare.com
Just Culture

Malicious

Knowingly Impaired

Choices – Unintentional / Risky / Reckless

Substitution Test

Frequent Flier – Repetitive Events
Inherent Human Limitations

Negative influence of fatigue and other physiological factors
- procedural integrity
- complex decision making

Limited ability to multitask: - cell phones / texting
Inherent Human Limitations

**Limited memory capacity** – 5-7 pieces of information in short term memory

**Inherent error rates** - errors of commission – 1/300
- errors of omission – 1/100

**Negative effects of stress** – increased error rates – task fixation
What Happens If You Make An Error?

In this work setting, it is difficult to discuss errors.

Note: Use the multicolored bars to see how you fit with the benchmark archive. If you have less red and more green than the benchmark, you are more positive than the benchmark. If the colors all match up, you are about the same as the benchmark.
Perspectives on Human Error – Dekker

Old View

• Human error is a cause of trouble
• You need to find people’s mistakes, bad judgments and inaccurate assessments
• Complex systems are basically safe
• Make systems safer by restricting the human contribution

New View

• Human error is a symptom of deeper system trouble
• Instead, understand how their assessments and actions made sense at the time — context
• Complex systems are basically unsafe
• People must create safety through practice at all levels
Drift = Risk

100% Agreement Non - acceptable

Usual Space Of Action

‘Illegal normal’ Real Life standards 60-90%

100%
Expected safe space of action as defined by professional standards

100%

Safety Reg’s & good practices, accreditation standards

HIGH                      Production Performance                        LOW

LOW          Individual Benefits       HIGH

ACCIDENT

Attribution: Dr. Rene Amalberti
Professionalism

Do you have issues of unprofessional behavior in your facility?

Is there confidence that the behavior will be addressed and resolved when reported?

Is there one standard or set of rules that applies to everyone, regardless of job title?
Instituting a Culture of Professionalism: The Establishment of a Center for Professionalism and Peer Support

Jo Shapiro, MD, FACS; Anthony Whittemore, MD, FACS; Lawrence C. Tsen, MD

Leaders of medical institutions are responsible for creating environments in which physicians, scientists, and other health care professionals are able to sustain their deep capacity for high-quality, compassionate care. Creating such environments depends on supporting a culture of trust, which has been identified as the core of successful leadership.1-3

The mission statements of both academic and community-based medical centers and hospitals characteristically reflect high aspirations for excellence in patient care. Yet, despite significant resources directed toward improving the delivery of health care, the rate of preventable and iatrogenic patient injuries has not improved significantly.4,5 Although a number of reasons have been cited for this lack of progress,6,7 there is growing recognition that an environment in which professionalism...

Article-at-a-Glance

Background: There is growing recognition that an environment in which professionalism is not embraced, or where expectations of acceptable behaviors are not clear and enforced, can result in medical errors, adverse events, and unsafe work conditions.

Methods: The Center for Professionalism and Peer Support (CPPS) was created in 2008 at Brigham and Women’s Hospital (BWH), Boston, to educate the hospital community regarding professionalism and manage unprofessional behavior. CPPS includes the professionalism initiative, a disclosure and apology process, peer and defendant support programs, and wellness programs. Leadership support, establishing be-
“Behaviors that undermine a culture of safety”

Verbal or physical threats

Intimidation

Reluctance/refusal to answer questions, refusal to answer pages or calls

Impatience with questions

Condescending language or intonation
The Aim: Hierarchy of *Responsibility*  
No Hierarchy of *Respect*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common responses</th>
<th>Appropriate feedback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate data</td>
<td>Not a court of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Exactly who said this?</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal sabotage</td>
<td>Not an isolated incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dr. X is trying to discredit me</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other people like me</td>
<td>You shouldn’t have a disruptive working relationship with anyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am special and talented</td>
<td>Not a performance evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I do work that no one else is qualified to do</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is a systems problem</td>
<td>Yes, and you still are responsible for your behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>If this whole system functioned better…</em></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Jo Shapiro MD, BWH
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common responses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unfair process</strong></td>
<td>We hold everyone to the same standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I’m being singled out because …</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patient advocacy</strong></td>
<td>Disruptive behavior is a safety risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Others aren’t responsible for patients the way I am</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prove harm</strong></td>
<td>We don’t need to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Give me one example …</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal style</strong></td>
<td>Impact not intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I don’t mean anything by it</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I am no worse than others</strong></td>
<td>We are focusing on your issues right now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I am certainly not the only one</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reporting Concerns – What Should Happen:

Confidential discussion with Director

Investigation

Discussion with supervising leaders/manager

Meeting with disruptor

Document all interactions
I would feel safe being treated here as a patient.

Source Data: Sep 2018
Learning Systems

Build organizational trust through identifying and resolving defects
Make learning visible — feedback is key
This requires ownership and infrastructure
Always move toward higher order problem solving
Learning boards capture ideas and issues from everyone

ANALOG: proven results

DIGITAL: available everywhere on any device.
Connecting on key topics, during and between huddles
LENS: Using Learning Boards to Drive Sustainable Improvement

Voice of the frontline

Improvement
Putting it all together

Effective Leadership – present, learning, providing feedback, building trust

Culture – clearly defined behaviors that support teamwork, collaboration and patient centered care

Learning systems – units that plan forward/reflect back, capture issues and defects for resolutions, and have clear aims to improve - cultural, operational, clinical